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When Freedom of Speech Comes at a Cost:
A Case Study of E.S. v. Austria
RACHAEL TAYLOR*
ABSTRACT
In the fall of 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
issued a decision upholding the criminal conviction of an Austrian
national (E.S.) in violation of Austria's Criminal Code against the
disparagement of religious doctrines. Her initial conviction in the
Austrian court was based on statements she made about the Prophet
Muhammad while teaching a series of seminars entitled "Basic
Information on Islam." In upholding her conviction, the ECtHR found
that there had been no violation of the Austrian's right to freedom of
expression under Article 10 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights (Convention), and therefore Austria's
conviction was valid and did not impermissibly infringe on her right to
freedom of expression. This case adds yet another dimension to the
polarizing debate regarding freedom of expression and the permissible
limitations that may be placed upon this freedom. In this article, I argue
that this case can be viewed as a turning point in the free expression
debate, and perhaps indicates an awareness that such restrictions on
speech may be necessary in order to maintain public safety and order.
INTRODUCTION
In October 2018, the ECtHR issued a decision in regard to the
freedom of expression under the Convention, upholding criminal
sanctions against an Austrian national for statements she made that
the Austrian Court held had "disparag[ed]" the Prophet Muhammad.'
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The ruling of this case has been both praised and criticized for its
implications on freedom of expression: not only for the countries party to
the convention, but for the precedent this decision may have set for
other courts internationally experiencing violence due to unregulated
speech. While many may feel that this case poses a serious threat to
principles of freedom of expression, I argue that such limitations may be
necessary in our current social climate as a means to address the rising
incidence of hate crimes and violence around the world.
First, I provide a background of this case in order to highlight some
of the key aspects of the Court's reasoning behind its holding. Then I
address some of the main criticisms of this ruling and indicate some of
the shortcomings of these popular dissenting arguments against the
ECtHR's holding. Last, I discuss some of the prevailing theories of free
expression and how this decision comports and departs from these
traditional views. This note shows that cases regarding freedom of
expression can serve an important preventative role, and that while
limitations on freedom of expression may be undesirable, these
limitations may be necessary.
I. THE CASE OF E.S. v. AUSTRIA
This case against the Republic of Austria came before the European
Court of Human Rights in 2018 under Article 34 of the Convention.2 An
Austrian national, E.S., claimed that her criminal conviction for
disparaging religious doctrines violated her rights to freedom of
expression under Article 10 of the Convention.3
Regional Court
The applicant's Austrian criminal conviction arose from statements
E.S. made during several seminars she held in January 2008, entitled
"Basic Information on Islam," at the right-wing Freedom Party
Education Institute in Vienna, Austria.4 The Vienna Regional Court
1. E.S. v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2018), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{
"fulltext":["E.S.%20v.%2OAustria"],"documentcollectionid2": ["JUDGMENTS","DECISION
S"],"itemid":["001-187188"J}.
2. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms As
Amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, Council of Europe, art. 34, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No.
005 ("The Court may receive applications from any person ... claiming to be the victim of
a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention
or the Protocols thereto.").
3. E.S., Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1; see also id. art. 10.
4. E.S., Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2.
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found the teacher's statements regarding the Prophet Muhammad to be
incriminating. For example, in one of the seminars, E.S. stated:
One of the biggest problems we are facing today is that
Muhammad is seen as the ideal man, the perfect human,
the perfect Muslim. That means that the highest
commandment for a male Muslim is to imitate
Muhammad, to live his life. This does not happen
according to our social standards and laws. Because he
was a warlord, he had many women, to put it like this,
and liked to do it with children. And according to our
standards he was not a perfect human. We have huge
problems with that today, that Muslims get into conflict
with democracy and our value system.5
E.S. went on to make comments about one of the most important
Islamic writings, the Sahih Al-Bukhari, stating that "one can be sure
that all Muslims [will] recogni[z]e it. And unfortunately, in Al-Bukhari
the thing with Aisha [one of Muhammad's wives who was an adolescent
at the time of their marriage]6 and child sex is written."7 E.S. also retold
a discussion she had with her sister in which her sister informed E.S.
that she could "not say it like that! [that Muhammad was a pedophile]."
E.S. recounted to the participants her response:
A 56-year-old and a six-year-old? What do you call that?
Give me an example? What do we call it, if it is not
paedophilia? . . . We have heard that so many times.
"Those were different times" - it wasn't okay back then,
and it's not okay today. Full stop. And it is still
happening today. One can never approve something
like that.8
These seminars were publicly advertised and were aimed at young
voters as part of a "free education package,"9 and E.S. did not select the
participants in the lecture. Unbeknownst to E.S., an undercover
journalist participated in the seminars, whose employer ultimately
reported the statements to the public prosecutor. 10 In February of 2010,
5. Id. at 3.
6. Id. at 3-4.
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2.
10. Id.
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E.S. was "questioned by the police concerning certain statements she
had made during the seminars," and charges were later brought against
her for inciting hatred," a crime in Austria pursuant to Article 188 of
Austria's Criminal Code.12
In response to her charges, E.S. claimed to have based her above
statements on historical accounts that one of Muhammad's wives,
Aisha, who was six-years-old when they were married, and allegedly
nine-years-old when the marriage was consummated.13 Therefore,
according to E.S., because these statements were factual, they were
immune from sanction.'4 The Regional Court did not share this view,
and although the statements may have had some basis in fact, the
Court perceived the statements to be "derogatory value judgments."
5 As
E.S. did not present any evidence to support her contention, the Court
was unable to conclude that E.S. was actually trying to relay a
statement of fact and not espouse a prejudicial judgment of Islam.1
6
According to the Court, "[b]ecause pedophilia was behavio[r which was
ostracized by society and outlawed,"'7 it felt E.S.'s statements violated
Austria's Criminal Code by "[p]resenting objects of religious worship in
a provocative way capable of hurting the feelings of the followers of that
religion could be conceived as a malicious violation of the spirit of
tolerance," a spirit which the Court viewed as one of the bases of a well-
functioning democratic society.18
Furthermore, the Court took into account that the seminars were
open to the general public when considering the propriety of the
sanctions. It concluded that "because of the public nature of the
seminars, which had not been limited to members of the Freedom Party,
it was conceivable that at least some of the participants might have
been disturbed by the statements."'9
Ultimately E.S. was convicted of disparaging religious doctrines,
and the Court determined that the "applicant had not intended to
approach the topic in an objective manner, but had directly aimed to
11. Id
12. STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE] § 188, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/
Dokumente/BgblPdf71974_60_0/1974_60_0.pdf (Austria).
13. See W. MONTGOMERY WATT, MUHAMMAD: PROPHET AND STATESMAN 102 (1961).
14. See E.S., Eur. Ct. H.R. at 4-5.
15. Id. at 4-
16- See id. at 6-
17. Id. at 4-
18. Id. at 4-5-
19. Id. at 4.
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degrade Muhammad."20 The Court issued E.S. a fine of 480 Euros; if she
failed to pay, she would receive 60 days incarceration.21
To support its reasoning, the Court noted that "child marriages were
not the same as pedophilia, and were not only a phenomenon of Islam,"
but also very common among much of the European monarchy.22 By
taking Muhammad's marital relationships out of the historical context
in which they occurred, the Court perceived that the real purpose
behind E.S.'s comments was to incite prejudice.23 Along with this
historical fact, the Court addressed that while the freedom of religion as
protected by Article 9 of the Convention did not allow one to be free from
religious criticism, the manner in which religious views are attacked
"could engage the State's responsibility in order to guarantee the
peaceful exercise of the rights under Article 9."24 Under this framework,
the Court maintained that the statements made by E.S. in her lectures
were a threat to the peaceful exercise of Islam in Austria and furthered
prejudicial beliefs about Muslims, which warranted sanctioning.25
Appellate and Supreme Court Rulings
E.S. subsequently appealed her conviction to the ECtHR and again
argued that the statements were statements of fact, not value
judgments, and that she had not intended to disparage Muhammad but
was merely "criticiz[ing] the notion that an adult had had sexual
intercourse with a nine-year-old . . . [and questioned] whether this ...
[was] paedophilia."26 E.S. further claimed that her statements were
covered by her rights under Article 10, which reads as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to
receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or
cinema enterprises.
20. Id. at 4-5.
21. Id. at 2-3.






INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 27:2
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety . . . .27
Based on the tenets above, E.S. asserted that her rights under this
article "included the right to impart opinions and ideas that offend[],
shock[] or disturb[]" and therefore her statements were protected.
28
While this is true of Article 10, the Court noted the caveat that, while
one has the right to impart shocking and disturbing opinions, there is a
fine line between shocking speech and that which "seek[s] to spread,
incite or justify hatred based on intolerance, including religious
intolerance."29 The Court determined that such statements "do not enjoy
the protection afforded by Article 10 of the Convention."30
E.S. further claimed in her appeal that her statements in the
context of these seminars should be viewed as objective criticisms of
religion, contributing to public debate-not statements aimed at
defaming the Prophet or spurring religious intolerance.31 The Court of
Appeals did not find this argument persuasive. The Court felt it was
evident that "the permissible limits were exceeded where criticism
ended and insults or mockery of a religious belief or person of worship . .
. began;"32 and that "even if the applicant had had the right to critici[z]e
others' attempts to imitate Muhammad, her statements showed her
intention to unnecessarily disparage and deride Muslims."
33 The Court
of Appeals thus upheld her conviction.34 The Supreme Court affirmed,
as it considered that E.S. had not intended to contribute to a serious
debate about Islam or the issue of child marriage, but had instead
aimed "to defame Muhammad by accusing him of a specific sexual
preference, based on the assumption that he had had sexual intercourse
with a prepubescent child, in order to show that he was not a worthy
subject of worship."
35
27. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as
Amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, supra note 2, art. 10.
28. E.S., Eur. Ct. H.R. at 5.
29. Id. at 16.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 5.
32. Id. at 6.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 7.
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European Court of Human Rights'Decision
After losing her appeal to the Austrian Supreme Court, E.S.
petitioned the ECtHR36 to take her case, hoping that the ECtHR would
not only reverse her conviction but also hold that this section of the
Austrian Criminal Code punishing the disparagement of religious
doctrines was a "violation of Article 10 of the Convention of Human
Rights."37 It is important to note that the Human Rights Council, which
is comprised of the parties to the Convention, has stated in its view on
free expression:
Criminal sanctions are only appropriate in respect to
incitement to hatred . . . there is a high symbolic value
in the pan-European introduction of criminal sanctions
against incitement to hatred. It gives strong signals to
all parts of society and to all societies that an effective
democracy cannot bear behavio[]rs and acts which
undermine its core values: pluralism, tolerance, respect
for human rights and non-discrimination. It is essential
however that the application of legislation against
incitement to hatred be done in a non-discriminatory
manner. 38
E.S. argued to the ECtHR that Austria's code was an impermissible
infringement of her right to free expression, as she felt that her
statements were protected under Article 10, which includes "the
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and
ideas without interference by public authority."39 In asserting that her
conviction for the previously mentioned statements was an unlawful
36. See, e.g., John G. Merrils, European Court of Human Rights, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Court-of-Human-Rights (last
updated Mar. 14, 2016)
("European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), judicial organ established in 1959 that is
charged with supervising the enforcement of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms .. . [t]he convention obligates signatories to guarantee
various civil and political freedoms, including the freedom of expression and religion and
the right to a fair trial.").
37. See E.S., Eur. Ct. H.R. at 12.
38. Eur. Comm'n for Democracy Through L. ("Venice Commission"), Report on the
Relationship Between Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Religion: The Issue of
Regulation and Prosecution of Blasphemy, Religious Insult and Incitement to Religious
Hatred, (CDL-AD)(2008)026, TT 90-91 (Oct. 23, 2008).
39. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as
Amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, supra note 2, art. 10.
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interference on her right to freedom of expression, she attested that the
domestic courts "failed to address the substance of the impugned
statements."40 E.S. argued that because the information she relayed
was linked to at least some factual basis, the statements were not mere
value judgments and therefore did not exceed the permissible limits of
free expression under Article 10.41
Despite these contentions, the ECtHR determined that the lower
courts had comprehensively addressed the substance of the impugned
statements and concluded that they had not been a part of an objective
discussion concerning Islam or the issues of child marriage. They
concluded that the statement had been aimed at defaming Muhammad
and therefore had "been capable of arousing justified indignation."
42
In rebutting E.S.'s claim that statements such as the ones made in
her seminars were necessary for rich public debate, the Court explained
that it was not enough to merely "pack incriminating statements into
the wrapping of an otherwise acceptable expression of opinion and
deduce that this would render the statements exceeding the permissible
limits of freedom of expression passable."4 3 This is contrary to the
appellant's argument that some individual statements, no matter how
troublesome, had to be tolerated during a lively discussion." Sneaking
inciting language into an otherwise innocuous setting to perpetuate
potential negative perceptions of a religious group as a whole did not, in
the Court's view, contribute to public discussion and debate.4 5
The ECtHR also endorsed the domestic court's method of taking
other factors into consideration besides the statements themselves, such
as the wider context in which the statements were made, stating that
"[i]n conclusion, the Court finds that in the instant case the domestic
courts comprehensively assessed the wider context of the applicant's
statements, and carefully balanced her right to freedom of expression
with the rights of others to have their religious feelings protected and to
have religious peace preserved in Austrian society."46
Given these reasons, the ECtHR decided that the lower courts had
legitimately "put forward relevant and sufficient reasons and [the
Court] finds that the interference with the applicant's rights under
Article 10 did indeed corresponded to a pressing social need and was
40. E.S., Eur. Ct. H.R. at 12.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 18-19.
43. Id. at 19.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 20.
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proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued."47 The domestic courts had
a much better understanding of the current state of Austrian society
and found that E.S's statements posed potential social harms.
Therefore, the Court felt inclined to support the lower courts'
determination that intervention was warranted, concluding that there
had been "no violation of Article 10 of the Convention."48
II. ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT ON HUMAN RIGHTS' REASONING
It is important to note the structure of Article 10 (Freedom of
Expression) to understand the ECtHR's analysis of this case. Under the
Convention, free expression does not come free of responsibilities.49
Freedom of expression under Article 10 differs from the American First
Amendment. The American First Amendment asserts the right to free
speech in absolute, stating "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free practice thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech."50 Under Article 10, one must
recognize and abide by the idea that freedom of expression comes with
the duty of acting to maintain a peaceful society.51 Thus, if speech is
found to interfere with this aim by encouraging violence or disrupting
peace between citizens, it may warrant regulation.52
It should also be observed that Article 9 (Freedom of Thought,
Conscience, Religion)53 protects the free practice of religion but, as noted
in the previous section, does not prohibit one's right to criticize a
religion or share an opinion on religious ideals.54 Interestingly, both of
these articles provide a safeguard for protecting the values of a
democratic society, such as religious tolerance, by allowing the State to
intervene when speech may serve to impede the democratic aims of the
Convention.5 5 Therefore, in cases like the one at hand, courts take the
approach of balancing the conflicting rights involved where there seems




49. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as
Amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, supra note 2, art. 10.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
51. See E.S., Eur. Ct. H.R. at 15.
52. See id. at 15-16.
53. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms As
Amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, supra note 2, art. 9.
54. See E.S., Eur. Ct. H.R. at 15.
55. See id. at 4-5.
56. See id. at 16-17.
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In balancing the rights enshrined in Article 9 and those of Article
10, the ECtHR held in E.S., that E.S.'s freedom of expression did not
prevail over the right of Austrian citizens to be free to practice their
religion.57 The Court determined that E.S.'s speech perverted the aims
of tolerance that the ECtHR recognizes as necessary for a well working
democracy, because it found that her statements were likely to increase
prejudice towards a religious group, which would likely incite hatred,
and such hate would likely impede the free practice of Islam in
Austria.5 8 Based off of this analysis, one can infer that guaranteeing the
safety of citizens to practice their religion and maintaining peace among
citizens of different backgrounds was a more pressing concern than
ensuring E.S.'s right to express prejudicial views.5 9 This is evidenced in
the statement, "a state may therefore legitimately consider it necessary
to take measures aimed at repressing certain forms of conduct,
including the imparting of information and ideas judged incompatible
with respect for the freedom of thought, conscience and religion
of others."60
To help determine the proper balance between these conflicting
rights, the Court emphasized both the importance of the context and the
intent behind E.S.'s statements.6 1 In looking at the intent behind the
statements, the Court made the important determination that there
was no other possible objective behind such degradation of an important
Islamic religious figure than to encourage prejudicial sentiments
towards the religion's followers, regardless of the supposed veracity of
the statements. The ability for a court to make this difficult
determination of what speech constitutes debate and what speech is
actually likely to incite hate and violence has been a prevailing concern
among free speech theorists who argue such line-drawing only invites
subjectivity and cannot be done without great risk of error, leading to
the censoring of much speech that is not in fact hateful. This contention
will be discussed later at greater length.
To make this difficult determination between hateful speech and
that of public discourse, it is likely that the ECtHR accounted for the
context in which these statements were made, in a time of rising
animosity toward the Muslim faith across the globe.62 This aspect is an
57. See id. at 19.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 19.
60. Id. at 16.
61. See id. at 18.
62. See, e.g, Christine Ogan et al., The Rise of Anti-Muslim Prejudice: Media and
Islamophobia in Europe and the United States, 76 INT'L. COMM. GAZErE 27, 27-46 (2014)
(describing a study detailing the global rise in Islamophobia); Jenna Johnson & Abigail
Hauslohner, 'I Think Islam Hates Us'- A Timeline of Trump's Comments About Islam and
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important inference from the Court's basis for their decision as no form
of expression exists in a vacuum, and it is impossible to determine
whether statements would interfere with a peaceful democracy without
taking into consideration the aims the statements are attempting to
achieve regarding the location, time period, and current climate in
which they are made.63 In upholding E.S.'s conviction, the Court seems
to be aware of the fact that speech has incredible power to turn ideas
into action and prejudicial views can be a harm to society as they can
lead to hate-based actions.64 This position is evidenced in the European
Council's statement hat:
Incidents of religious intolerance, discrimination and
related violence, as well as of negative stereotyping of
individuals on the basis of religion or belief, continue to
rise around the world, and [the Council] condemns, in
this context, any advocacy of religious hatred against
individuals that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence, and urges States to
take effective measures, as set forth in the present
resolution, consistent with their obligations under
international human rights law, to address and combat
such incidents.6 5
In this light, the ECtHR's decision in E.S. and the minimal
sanctions involved (a relatively small fine of 480 euros) can thus be
viewed as an important symbolic posture for the countries party to the
Convention, as well as other nations that provide for free expression:
prejudicial views will not be tolerated. Such a stance is necessary to
address the ubiquitous issue of hate-motivated violence.66
Muslims, WASH. POST (May 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2017/05/20/i-think-islam-hates-us-a-timeline-of-trumps-comments.about-islam-
and-muslims/?noredirect=on&utmterm=.6983f31cl2de; Reuters, Religious Conflict in
Global Rise, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 14, 2014, 6:50 PM), https://www.telegraphco.uk
/news/worldnews/middleeast/10572342/Religious-conflict-in-global-rise-reporthtml.
63. See E.S., Eur. Ct. H.R. at 18 ("The Court notes at the outset that the subject matter
of the instant case is of a particularly sensitive nature, and that the (potential) effects of
the impugned statements depend, to a certain degree on the situation in the country
where the statements were made at the time and the context in which they were made.").
64. See The Psychology of Hate Crimes, AM. PSYCROL. ASS'N,
https://www.apa.org/advocacy/interpersonal-violence/hate-crimes (last visited Jan. 1,
2018) ("Hate crimes are an extreme form of prejudice ... [p]ublic and political discourse
may devalue members of unfamiliar groups . . . [this] can lead to dehuimanization of
unfamiliar groups and to targeted aggression.").
65. E.S., Eur. Ct. H.R. at 10.
66. See id. at 8.
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III. CRITICISMS OF THE E. S. RULING
Despite the potential positive aims behind the ECtHR's ruling in
E.S., this decision was not met without controversy.67 A writer for The
Atlantic stated his view that the decision was actually a result of an
"inability of some Muslim's to handle polemics against their religion
with grace."6 8 The article conveys the general tone that this writer
viewed E.S's statements as nothing more than criticism that did not
have any potential negative effects aside from possibly hurting some
feelings.6 9 To this writer, E.S. was just "repeating" the historical claims
against Muhammad, and this ruling represented a "bad sign for the civil
liberties in Europe."70
Notably, the author did not indicate that E.S. was not only
recounting the historical fact that Muhammad had a young wife, but
also adding her own influence as well.7' Further, by only looking at the
statements as religious criticism, the author seems to belittle the
potential impact they may have on furthering prejudice.72 Therefore, it
is useful to note that many studies have shown that "[d]angerous
speech-hate speech that has the potential to influence people to accept,
condone, or commit violence against targeted groups-is consequently
considered both a warning sign and an instrument of group-targeted
violence."73 Additionally, to indicate that prejudicial effects are far from
insignificant, a recent study from the United Kingdom showed that hate
crimes linked to religion had doubled in the last three years in the
67. See, e.g., Shane Armstrong, The Case of E.S. v. Austria: What It Means for the
Rights of Europeans, LIBERALIST INT'L Ass'N (Nov. 3, 2018), https://1iberalistia.com/the-
ember/es-v-austria-echr-ruling-03-11-2018; Simon Cottee, A Flawed European Ruling on
Free Speech, ATLANTIC (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.comlideas
/archive/2018/10/europe-rules-against-free-speechl574369/; Frank Cranmer, Freedom of
Expression or Criminal Blasphemy?: ES v Austria, L. & Religion U.K. (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://www.lawandreligionuk-com/2018/10/26/freedom-of-expression-or-criminal-
blasphemy-es-v-austrial, Can Yeginsu & John Williams, Criminalizing Speech to Protect
Religious Peace? The ECtHR Ruling in E.S. v. Austria, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 28, 2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/61642/criminalizing-speech-protect-religious-peace-ecthr-
ruling-e-s-v-austrial.







73. Rachel Brown, Defusing Hate: A Strategic Communication Guide to Counteract
Dangerous Speech, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, https://www.ushmm.org/
confront-genocide/how-to-prevent-genocide/hate-speech-and-incitement-to-genocide
defusing-hate-a-gnide-to-counteract-dangerous-speech (last updated 2016).
442
THE COST OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH
United Kingdom, and that the Muslim community was the most
commonly targeted group, followed by members of the Jewish
community.74 With this information in mind, one can start to see that
statements that further prejudice, especially against an already
marginalized groups, should not be ignored.
Another point of contention against this ruling is evidenced by an
unenthused journalist who stated that this ruling "should strike fear
into the parents of Europe" as he felt that the ruling punished E.S. for
her opinions, not for inciting hatred.75 This is evidenced by his
statement "that [the view that Muhammad was a pedophile] was E.S.'s
opinion, just as it was Voltaire's opinion that Christianity is an 'infamy'
that must be 'erased' and just as it was Nietzsche's opinion that Jesus is
not a worthy subject of worship."7 6
This writer's argument does add some color to this debate, as Article
10 and other free speech regimes typically do protect the ability for one
to share one's opinions.77 Although the author is persuasive with his
examples, one can differentiate E.S. from Voltaire and Nietzsche in this
instance. Rather than merely expressing an opinion, E.S. was teaching
a course, "Basic Information on Islam," and therefore was an instructor
possessing a role of authority and credibility in the eyes of her
participants, which could make her statements more likely to be
perceived as truisms rather than opinions. Moreover, if the participants
were not already knowledgeable on the subject matter, or already
reserved biases towards Muslims, E.S.'s statements would not
necessarily be understood within a context of simple opinion.
Under the Convention, one does have the right to share their
opinions,78 but the permissible limits of that right come into question
when one abuses that right to perpetuate prejudicial opinions under the
74. Ashley Kirk, Hate Crime Linked to Religion Doubled in Three Years, TELEGRAPH
(Oct. 16, 2018, 11:29 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/10/16/hate-crime-
linked-religion-doubled-three-years/.
75. Dominic Green, Europe's Dangerous Blasphemy Laws Are Ripe for Exploitation,
WKLY. STANDARD (Nov. 5, 2018, 2:55 AM), https://www.weeklystandard.comldominic-
green/european-court-blasphemy-free-speech-isnt-what-it-used-to-be.
76. See id.
77. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as
Amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, supra note 2, art. 10. See generally Richard Wike &
Katie Simmons, Global Support for Principle of Free Expression, but Opposition to Some
Forms of Speech, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.pewglobal.org
/2015/11/18/global-support-for-principle-of-free-expression-but-opposition-to-some-forms-
of-speech/ (summarizing results of a study holding that "nearly all 38 nations polled say it
is at least somewhat important to live in a country with free speech, a free press and
freedom on the internet").
78. See STEVEN GREER, THE EXCEPTIONS TO ARTICLES 8 TO 11 OF THE EuRoPEAN
CONVENTIONON HuMAN RIGHTS 38 (1997).
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guise of education. To further indicate the dangers posed by prejudicial
statements, sociologist Milton Kleg asserts that "the sources of prejudice
are varied. But regardless of how and why prejudices form, the fact
remains that, like seeds, prejudice takes root, grows, and blossoms into
what may become violent hate."79 Given the mushrooming effect that
prejudice seems to have, it is unsurprising that some legal theorists are
actually in favor of sanctions like the ones in this case, supporting the
view that "[c]ounteracting prejudice's] dissemination provides us with
one avenue of preventing this type of violence from occurring."
8 0
Interestingly, this author's greatest issue was not with the ECtHR's
analysis, which he did acknowledge accurately followed the applicable
laws at issue, but with the fact that such a law (prohibiting the
disparagement of religious doctrines) was permitted in the first place.81
This is evidenced in his statement: "[i]f [disparaging religious figures] is
a crime- and in Austria it is- then she is guilty, and it falls to the people
of Austria to revise their laws to protect her rights, and theirs."
82 While
the author may perceive that laws against blasphemous speech are
unduly intrusive on individuals' rights to free expression, Austria is not
an outlier. In 2017, one in three countries were reported to have
criminal sanctions for blasphemous speech like that at issue in the case
of E.S.8 3
Another argument this author had against the holding of this case
was that the ECtHR was not valuing free expression enough. Instead,
the author argues, Austria should be more like America when it comes
to free speech, stating that "the American system of virtually limitless
debate has proved highly capable of discrediting Irving (holocaust
denier), and of allowing Islamophobes and Islamists to yap at each
other. It blames violence on the violent."84
The issue with this argument is that the author seems to see
absolutely no value to be had in restricting some types of speech, or that
any forms of sanctions on speech may be necessary to maintain an
orderly society. Such a blas6 view seems a direct affront to popular
psychological studies of prejudice like that of Gordon W. A11port, who
concluded that '"prolonged and intense verbal hostility always precedes
79. Alexander Tsesis, Dignity and Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a
Democracy, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 520 (2009).
80. Brown, supra note 72.
81. See Wood, supra note 67.
82. Id.
83. Stephanie Nebehay, Blasphemy Laws: One-in-Three Countries Still Criminalise
Anti-Religious Sentiment, Study Finds, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 29, 2017, 9:51 AM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/blasphemy-laws-countires-islamic-pakistan-
yemen-anti-religious-sentiment-illegal-criminalise-freedom-a
7 9 17 6 11.html.
84. Wood, supra note 67.
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a riot'68 5 and "historical evidence [indicates] that hate speech is critical
to the perpetration of violence."86
The issue of this author's over idealization of the American system
of free expression is that it fails to note how America has seen its fair
share of hate influenced violence,87 and the issue with the over
idealization of an "anything goes, free market place of ideas" model for
free expression will be further discussed.
Another popular argument regarding the outcome of this case is the
fear among some in the Muslim community that the ruling would seem
to be "playing favorites for those of the Muslim faith, and actually 'serve
to stoke Islamophobia, rather than promote integration."'8 8 This is
unfortunately one of the most persuasive arguments against
sanctioning speech like that in the case of E.S.; the persuasive effect
comes not from the rights of the speaker being silenced but more from
fear of retaliation to those who are being protected by such sanctions. It
is hard to think of a way to address this potential side effect of speech
regulation beyond trying to promote tolerance, such as making special
efforts to properly educate citizens on the values of a diverse society as
well as debunking popular misconceptions and stereotypes of different
races and religions.8 9 If we make such efforts, hopefully individuals will
not grow to resent speech regulations that protect their fellow citizens,
but rather see regulation simply as part of the cost of ensuring peace in
a democratic nation, an aim that benefits everyone.
IV. FOUNDATIONAL THEORIES OF FREE EXPRESSION:
REALISTIC IN TODAY'S SOCIETY?
What many of these arguments against this ruling have in common
is that they appear to rely on certain classic theories of free expression
to support their contention that this ruling is an affront to free
85. Tsesis, supra note 78, at 514 (quoting GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF
PREJUDICE 60 (1979)).
86. Id. at 516.
87. See, e.g., HOWARD J. EHRLICH, HATE CRIMES AND ETHNOVIOLENCE: THE HISTORY,
CURRENT AFFAIRS, AND FUTURE OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA (2009); MICHAEL NEWTON
& JUDY ANN NEWTON, RACIAL & RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: A CHRONOLOGY (1991);
Maritza Perez, From Rhetoric to Racial Violence: Hate Crimes Against Latinos in America,
Then and Now, 43 AZTLAN 151 (2018).
88. Mustafa Akyol, The Prophet Mohammad Doesn't Need Courts to Protect Him,
CATO INST. (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/prophet-
mohammed-doesnt-need-courts-protect-him.
89. See, e.g., Calvin K. Lai et al., Reducing Implicit Prejudice, 7 SOc. PERSONALITY
PSYCHOL. COMPASS 315 (2013) (describing methods for influencing implicit prejudice and
potential solutions to implicit prejudice).
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expression. One of the most prevailing of these free expression theories
is that expression should never be censored or regulated, as it is
expression that helps one reach their true potential as an individual and
helps society find "truth."9 0 The idea that unlimited expression can
always lead to truth is personified by the famous quote by philosopher
Alexander Meiklejohn, "[flreedom is always wise."91 This stance is
further embodied by the work of Thomas Emerson, who was of the
position that "the process of conscious thought . .. can have no limits."
92
To Emerson, any form of restraint over expression is "the greatest
displeasure and indignity to a free and knowing spirit that can be put
upon him." 93
According to Emerson and other theorists in this camp, it is only
through expression that individuals can find truth, and while "full
discussion, open to all, involves some risks to the society that practices
it," these risks are worth taking, as eventually the accumulation of all
expressions will lead to the greater truth." Therefore, many of the
criticisms of the E.S. ruling can be inferred to be motivated by such a
stance, that the regulation of religiously insensitive speech impedes the
search for truth and hurts individual autonomy. That being said, the
regulation of speech like that in the case of E.S. is not in complete
conflict with this idea, as the "[r]egulation of objectively false
information conforms with free speech theory . . . . False information
does not add to our knowledge."9 5 By removing from society speech that
is patently false, or serves to support illegitimate stereotypes, the aims
of free expression in reaching greater truth are not being stifled,
but nurtured.
Another flaw in Emerson's theory is that it relies on the argument
that "open discussion . . . that lead[s] to greater cohesion" and that by
"allowing dissidents to expound their views [it] enables them 'to let off
steam,"' which will result in a release of energy, avoiding any threats to
law and order.96 This view of a sort of "safety valve" theory for free
expression foolishly relies on the presumption that allowing freedom of
expression in all forms will serve as an outlet to avoid violence. The
90. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 879 (1963).
91. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, The Congress and the People, in PoLITIcAL FREEDOM:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 112 (1960W.
92. Emerson, supra note 89, at 879.
93. Id. at 880 (quoting JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGYITCA 21 (Everyman's Library ed. 1927)
(1644)).
94. Id. at 886.
95. Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 411, 483 (1992).
96. Emerson, supra note 89, at 885.
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shortsightedness of this theory lies in the fact that it fails to note how a
greater accumulation of negative views can actually be used to enforce
prejudices and lead to violence, as opposed to trying to avoid it.97
Further, this theory is limited by time. Emerson himself noted that at
"times there may be substantial delay in the working out of critical
problems."8 The issue here is that in a society with increasing violence,
there may not be the time to wait for such "working out."
The dissenters against the E.S. opinion also appear to rely on the
theory of free expression, as a sort of "marketplace of ideas."99 This
theory "explains the importance of freedom of speech in terms of an
open 'marketplace' in which ideas are allowed to compete against one
another in an ongoing process of human enlightenment."1 0 0 Similar to
Emerson's theory, this theory relies on the thought that what is "right"
or "true" will eventually reign as the expressions that are "wrong" or
"false" will be exposed for what they are when subjected to the
marketplace. 101
While this may work in theory, in an increasingly polarized society
where individuals become further reliant on information that already
conforms to their own worldviews, it is unlikely that one's expressions
will be subject to the rigorous debate needed for this theory to hold
true.102 One journalist contributed her view of the flaws of this theory
by stating that "whatever its merits, the European position is rooted in
its experiences that the free market of ideas can fail-disastrously.
Dangerous ideas can catch on quickly, especially when people holding
power or influence endorse them."103 As E.S. was an individual with
97. See generally Wiktor Soral et al., Exposure to Hate Speech Icreases Prejudice
Through Desensitization, 44 AGGRESsiVE BEHAV. 136 (2018) (explaining research showing
that consistent exposure to hate speech increases desensitization and prejudice); Rachel
Hatzipanagos, How Online Hate Turns into Real Life Violence, WASH. POST (Nov. 30,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/11/30/how-online-hate-speech-is-
fueling-real-life-violence/?noredirect=on&utm term=.6122dee6276 (relating white-
supremacist online hate speech to violence).
98. Emerson, supra note 89, at 886.
99. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:4, Westlaw
(database updated April 2019).
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 69-110 (1993); David Robert
Grimes, Echo Chambers are Dangerous - We Must Try to Break Free of Our Online
Bubbles, GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2017, 6:27 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
science/blog/2017/dec/04/echo-chambers-are-dangerous-we-must-try-to-break-free-of-our-
online-bubbles.
103. Mila Versteeg, What Europe Can Teach America About Free Speech, ATLANTIC
(Aug. 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/what-europe-can-
teach-america-about-free-speechl537186/.
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influence over her participants, it is likely that her ideas regarding the
Prophet could have "caught on" quickly, and without the lively
marketplace that Emerson envisions, it is hard to tell whether such
comments would actually be exposed for what they are in the absence
of intervention.
Another main aspect of Emerson's theory which dissenters of the
E.S. opinion may be relying on is the view that only action should be
regulated by the State, as opposed to expression.10
4 According to
Emerson, "[e]xpression in itself is not normally harmful, and the
objective of limitation is not normally to suppress the communication as
such. Those who seek to impose limitation on expression do so ordinarily
in order to forestall some anticipated effect of expression in causing or
influencing other conduct."1 05 The issue here is that Emerson fails to see
how expression can lead to harm, while advocating a problematic hands-
off approach of the State until such harmful conduct occurs.
106 Such a
stance seems somewhat nonsensical, as the State should not stand idly
by and wait until something horrible happens to intervene, as opposed
to being proactive and stopping dangerous forms of expression before
they precipitate inevitably into violence. By treating expression and
conduct as two disparate entities, Emerson's theories fail to see how
they are in fact intimately related and have great influence over
one another. 107
Another aspect of first amendment theory that critics of the E.S.
decision seem to hold on to is the fear of government overregulation and
the prevailing argument that it is too difficult for governments to make
such distinctions without being subjective in determining what speech
is problematic and violent, and what is necessary for public debate.
108
Rebutting this contention, however, Mari Matsuda asserts that "we are
capable of discernment, of telling a cross burner from an antiwar
protestor . . .. If definition of harmful speech is impossible, we are doing
the impossible as we define slander [and] fraud."
10 9 To Matsuda this
distinction is not a hard one to make, as logical individuals are capable
of telling the difference between hateful speech and that of protest, and
104. See Emerson, supra note 89, at 889.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See generally Soral, supra note 96, at 144 (finding that exposure to hate speech
increases desensitization to such speech and "increase[s] outgroup prejudice expressed
toward the victims of those hostile statements").
108. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 89, at 889-92.
109. MARI J. MATSUDA, Progressive Civil Liberties, in WHERE is YoUR BODY? 131, 136-40
(1996).
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the law has been drawing these fine distinctions in other areas
for decades.110
According to Matsuda, "we do not have to let crosses burn, because
they are not about debating race relation[s]-they are about punishing,
silencing, and running families out of their homes."111 This argument
indicates how Matsuda relies heavily on the importance of context in
the free expression debate.112 Matsuda explains that "[w]e cannot
pretend not to know who is screaming what, to whom, in what context,
and with what result."113 In noting the importance of context, and
marking her stance against unrestricted freedom of expression,
Matsuda maintains that "[a]bsolutism is a luxury, the luxury of not
asking to whom, to what end, in what historical context, and with what
present politics."114
To Matsuda, regulations on speech may actually be a way to ensure
that everyone's rights, including the right to free expression, are
protected.11 5 Noting the counterintuitive nature of such a theory
Matsuda explains that "[t]his is indeed a paradox-no easy walk to
freedom, no easy civil liberties."1 16 Thus, the dissenters of the E.S.
decision can be said to not recognize the historical time in which such
statements are being made, a time with rising animosities towards the
Muslim faith.117 Furthermore, they fail to see how ensuring the ability
of their fellow citizens to feel safe in practicing their religion benefits
the rights of everyone as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of recent acts of hate occurring around the world, such as
the mass shooting of a synagogue in Pittsburgh by a man who
frequently espoused anti-Semitic views online, which resulted in the
110. See id. at 136.
111. Id. at 142.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 138.
114. Id. at 144.
115. See id. at 143.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Lizzie Dearden, Street Attacks on Muslims Rocket in UK as Perpetrators
'Emboldened' by Terror Attacks and Political Rhetoric, Report Finds, INDEPENDENT (Jul.
23, 2018, 12:03 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/attacks-
muslims-uk-terror-islam-hate-crime-brexit-tell-mama-a8457996.html; Katayoun Kishi,
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death of eleven; 1 18 the shooting of a mosque in Quebec which resulted in
the death of six;119 and an incident in Germany, where a man motivated
by anti-foreigner views intentionally drove off of the road to kill
pedestrians, which resulted in the death of four;120 it has become
painfully apparent that something needs to be done to curb hate-based
rhetoric before more of these horrific incidents occur. It has become
evident that "hate crime flourishes in an enabling environment,"121 and
if speech that is intended to incite prejudice and religious animosities is
allowed to continue, it will only serve to create the ideal breeding
ground for such violence. Unfortunately, it is also becoming increasingly
clear that "hate and intolerance do not respect political boundaries and
physical borders,"122 allowing for the issue of hate speech to be viewed
as an international crisis. Thus, rulings like E.S. v. Austria may be
necessary to put a stop to where most violent incidents likely begin,
with hate-based speech. If we cannot see an increase in rulings like that
in this case, then "in an unregulated marketplace of ideas, private
citizens need to take up the burden of holding the line against racist
extremism."123 Through legislative bodies or through the judiciary,
authorities must take more stringent action to guard against hate
speech, as it is having detrimental effects around the world and will
continue to do so unless something is changed. That being said, perhaps
the E.S. ruling can be viewed as a marginal step in the right direction.
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